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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
This case arises out of long-standing disagreements between Anthony Falco 
(“Falco”), the former Chief of Police of the Hoboken Police Department (“HPD”), and 
Dawn Zimmer (“Zimmer”), the former Mayor of Hoboken.  Falco generally alleges that 
Zimmer; Jon Tooke (“Tooke”), the former Director of Public Safety (“DPS”) of 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Hoboken; and the City of Hoboken (“Hoboken” and, collectively, “Appellees”) interfered 
with his operation of the HPD and withheld his benefits because he often criticized 
Zimmer and supported her political opponents.  Falco filed this lawsuit against Appellees, 
bringing claims for, inter alia, First Amendment retaliation and procedural due process 
violations.  After the District Court dismissed his case for the third time, Falco now 
appeals to us.  We determine here that the District Court erred in articulating and 
applying the relevant legal standard to Falco’s First Amendment retaliation claims, but 
did not err in assessing Falco’s procedural due process claims.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse in part and affirm in part the District Court’s orders and remand this case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Origins of the Dispute 
After approximately 38 years of rising through the ranks of the HPD, Falco 
became Chief of Police on June 18, 2009.  The New Jersey Department of Community 
Affairs appointed Falco to this position, as Hoboken was under the control of a state 
fiscal monitor at the time due to its failure to adopt a budget.  In the months leading up to 
his appointment, Falco had publicly supported then-Councilman Peter Cammarano 
(“Cammarano”) in his campaign for Mayor of Hoboken against then-Councilwoman 
Zimmer by attending fundraisers, strategy sessions, and door to door canvassing on his 
behalf.  After a bitter campaign, Cammarano narrowly defeated Zimmer by fewer than 
200 votes in a run-off election on June 9, 2009, and became Mayor of Hoboken on July 1, 
2009.  But, less than a month later, Cammarano was arrested on federal corruption 
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charges and thus forced to resign.  Then-Council President Zimmer was thereafter 
appointed Acting Mayor on July 30, 2009; elected Mayor on November 6, 2009; and 
reelected Mayor in November 2013.   
 At the heart of Falco’s case is his assertion that he experienced a series of 
retaliatory actions because of his political differences with, and statements critical of, 
Zimmer.  Falco alleges that Zimmer harbors political animus against him because he is a 
member of “Old Hoboken,” comprised of “individuals and local public servants whose 
families have resided in Hoboken for generations,” whereas she is a member of “New 
Hoboken,” comprised of “young professionals . . . who are more likely to commute to 
finance and professional jobs in New York City and who have moved to Hoboken as 
adults from other cities or towns.”  App. 177.  Because of this animus, Zimmer allegedly 
opposed Falco’s original appointment to Chief of Police while she was Councilwoman 
and then worked with Tooke to take action against Falco once she became Mayor.   
B. Falco’s Allegedly Protected Activity 
As to his First Amendment retaliation claims, Falco offers a smorgasbord of 
allegedly protected activity that he claims led Appellees to retaliate against him:  
(1) being a member of Old Hoboken; (2) supporting Cammarano in the election for 
Mayor of Hoboken in November 2009 and other political rivals of Zimmer in the 2010, 
2011, and 2013 municipal elections; (3) reporting the improper conduct of civilian 
officials in the Zimmer administration to the Hudson County Prosecutor in June 2010; 
(4) opposing Zimmer’s budget reduction plan that called for HPD layoffs by publicly 
speaking against the plan at a meeting with Zimmer in July 2010 and a Hoboken City 
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Council meeting in September 2010; (5) associating with Our Lady of Grace Catholic 
Church (“OLG”) and appointing its pastor, Father Alexander Santora (“Santora”), who 
had been critical of Zimmer in church bulletins and regional newspapers, to be Chaplain 
of the HPD in 2010; (6) having his daughter, an HPD officer, arrest Ian Sacs (“Sacs”), the 
then-Director of the Hoboken Parking Authority and member of Zimmer’s cabinet, for 
improperly commandeering a Hoboken vehicle and getting into an altercation with the 
driver in March 2011; (7) initiating this lawsuit in March 2013; (8) deciding to assign 
Kenneth Ferrante (“Ferrante”), the then-Lieutenant of the HPD and one of Zimmer’s 
political allies, to a nighttime shift in October 2013; (9) testifying pursuant to a subpoena 
in his official capacity as Chief of Police in Alicea v. Hoboken, a state court 
discrimination and retaliation lawsuit filed by Angel Alicea (“Alicea”), a former DPS of 
Hoboken, against Zimmer, in which Falco was extensively questioned about his 
allegations in the instant lawsuit in December 2013; and (10) refusing to countenance 
improper civilian interference in the day-to-day operations of the HPD and its ongoing 
investigations throughout his term as Chief of Police. 
C. Appellees’ Alleged Retaliation 
Falco alleges that, in response to his protected activity, Appellees retaliated 
against him in several ways.  First, Falco alleges that Appellees interfered in the daily 
operations of the HPD from 2009 to 2011.  In particular, Falco alleges the following acts 
of interference: (1) “micro-manag[ing]” the HPD and attempting to “marginalize” him, 
id. at 183; (2) Alicea’s writing him a memorandum criticizing him for failing to notify the 
Department of Public Safety of an ongoing, confidential investigation; (3) Alicea’s 
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distributing a confidential investigation report to civilian Hoboken employees and the 
media; (4) Alicea’s filing a request under the Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”), N.J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 47:1A-1 to -18, to obtain video recordings of an altercation that occurred 
inside HPD headquarters; (5) Alicea’s seeking the HPD’s roll calls, confidential lists that 
indicate which police officers are deployed in what locations; (6) Hoboken’s Law 
Director’s ordering an investigation into the HPD after a police officer was invited to a 
political event; and (7) Hoboken’s Office of Corporation Counsel’s “intimidat[ing]” an 
Acting Chief of the HPD into disclosing confidential information while Falco was on 
vacation, App. 188.  Falco claims that these actions violate N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-118, 
which articulates that the Chief of Police has direct responsibility for the efficiency and 
routine, day-to-day operations of the HPD. 
Second, Falco alleges that Appellees retaliated by canceling Hoboken’s 2012 St. 
Patrick’s Day Parade, an event for which OLG and Santora—whom Falco had previously 
appointed to be Chaplain of the HPD—had long served as custodians.   
Third, Falco alleges that Appellees denied him a written contract in 2012.  
According to Falco, Appellees denied his request for a written contract specifying his 
employment terms so that they could fiddle with his compensation depending on whether 
he adhered to their political agenda.  Falco claims that Appellees’ denying him a written 
contract violated both Hoboken’s pattern and practice over 40 years with other Chiefs of 
Police—including several of Falco’s immediate predecessors and his immediate 
successor—and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:11-14, which he avers requires that his contract 
have been in writing.   
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Fourth, Falco alleges that Appellees retaliated by both outright denying him 
various benefits and delaying the disbursement of other benefits in 2012, 2013, and into 
his retirement in 2014.  Because he did not have a formal employment contract with 
Hoboken, Falco claims that Appellees denied him two benefits in 2012 that are 
customarily given to superior officers of the HPD, each of which he had received in prior 
years: an annual uniform stipend of $1,300 and an annual attendance incentive, or sick 
incentive, of $1,500.  In addition to Appellees’ continued non-payment of these two 
compensation items in 2013, Falco claims that Appellees also denied him an annual court 
time and preparation benefit of $500, which he had received in previous years, after his 
testimony in Alicea.  Falco further claims that, even though other superior officers of the 
HPD received 1.95% pay increases in January 2013, he did not receive such an increase, 
allegedly in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-179, until he filed the instant lawsuit in 
March 2013.  He also alleges that, in 2013, he was denied five days’ pay for working 
certain overtime shifts during Superstorm Sandy.  Finally, Falco claims that Appellees 
delayed the disbursement of his accrued compensation upon retirement and, when they 
did eventually pay him, he received an amount “substantially less” than the over 
$400,000 to which he claims entitlement.  App. 209–10.       
 In sum, Falco presents a narrative of an acrimonious relationship between him and 
Appellees over the course of his tenure as Chief of Police.  On July 1, 2014, after more 
than 42 years of service, Falco retired from the HPD, having reached the mandatory 
retirement age of 65.  According to Falco, Appellees’ retaliation has deprived him of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensation and the opportunity to end an 
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honorable career with dignity.   
D. Procedural History 
 As a result, Falco filed this lawsuit on March 18, 2013, while still serving as Chief 
of Police.1  After two years of motions practice and extensions, Falco filed his second 
amended complaint, asserting 42 causes of action.  The District Court dismissed the 
second amended complaint but allowed Falco to refile certain claims, including those 
raising First Amendment retaliation and equal protection violations, but not others, 
including those raising procedural due process violations.  Subsequently, Falco filed his 
third amended complaint, asserting 19 causes of action.  The District Court then 
dismissed the third amended complaint but again permitted him to replead his First 
Amendment retaliation claims.  Consequently, Falco filed his fourth amended complaint, 
asserting a sole cause of action for First Amendment retaliation.  Yet again, the District 
Court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, this time with prejudice.   
 In its opinions, the District Court determined that Falco failed to allege sufficient 
facts to demonstrate First Amendment retaliation or procedural due process violations.  
On the former claims, the District Court principally held that (1) many of Falco’s claims 
of retaliation occurred before he engaged in protected activity; (2) Falco only has a 
“unilateral expectation” to the benefits he claims were taken in retaliation for his 
                                              
1 On January 26, 2016, while the instant lawsuit was pending in the District Court, Falco 
filed a substantially similar case raising state law claims against Appellees in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Law Division in Hudson County (“Superior Court”).  At the time 
the parties briefed the instant appeal, the state court case was ongoing.  Since then, 
however, that case has been adjudicated in Appellees’ favor on summary judgment. 
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protected activity, id. at 56 (citation omitted); (3) much of the alleged retaliation by 
Appellees was de minimis; (4) Falco’s association with Old Hoboken does not constitute 
protected political association because the group is amorphous and non-political; and 
(5) the alleged retaliation would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from speaking, as 
evidenced by Falco’s continued engagement in speech critical of Appellees.   
On the latter claims, the District Court essentially held that (1) Falco does not have 
a constitutionally protected property interest in the benefits to which he claims 
entitlement; (2) Falco has not sufficiently alleged that his salary was reduced in violation 
of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-179; and (3) Falco has alleged nothing more than an “abstract 
need or desire” for various incidental benefits, App. 11 (citations omitted).       
 Falco now appeals to us, seeking reinstatement of the First Amendment retaliation 
claims in his second and fourth amended complaints and the procedural due process 
claims in his second amended complaint.  Specifically, Falco asks us to reinstate 
(1) counts 25 to 32 of the second amended complaint, which claim First Amendment free 
speech and association retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) count 1 of the fourth 
amended complaint, which claims First Amendment free speech retaliation under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983; (3) counts 1 to 6 and 9 of the second amended complaint, which claim 
procedural due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) count 33 of the second 
amended complaint, which claims conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 
1985; and (5) count 42 of the second amended complaint, which claims attorneys’ fees 




II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1343(a).  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District 
Court’s grants of Appellees’ motions to dismiss de novo.  McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 
564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Omnipoint Commc’ns Enters., L.P. v. Newtown 
Twp., 219 F.3d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 2000)).        
 In conducting a de novo review of the District Court’s orders, we accept as true all 
of the well-pleaded allegations in Falco’s second and fourth amended complaints and 
draw all reasonable inferences in Falco’s favor.  See McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 
114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Miller v. Fortis, 475 F.3d 516, 519 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
Falco’s factual allegations, however, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level” to one that is “plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (citation omitted).  As a result, the District Court’s judgments 
are proper only if, accepting all of Falco’s well-pleaded allegations as true and construing 
the complaints in the light most favorable to Falco, we determine that Falco is not entitled 
to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaints.  See McGovern, 554 F.3d at 115 
(citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 This appeal presents us with three chief issues, the first of which is procedural and 
the latter two of which are substantive: (A) whether we may consider evidence outside of 
the District Court’s record that Falco presents for the first time in his opening brief on 
appeal, (B) whether Falco has stated any plausible First Amendment retaliation claims, 
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and (C) whether Falco has stated any plausible procedural due process claims.  We 
address each issue in turn.    
A. We Decline to Consider Evidence Outside the District Court’s Record 
In his opening brief, Falco includes and relies upon several pieces of evidence not 
part of the record before the District Court, including that (1) Falco testified in a Superior 
Court deposition that he was discouraged from exercising his First Amendment rights as 
a result of Appellees’ punishment; (2) Vincent Lombardi, the former President of the 
Hoboken Policemen’s Benevolent Association (“PBA”), testified that Zimmer had 
“probably” engaged in “retaliation against the [C]hief for cooperating with the union” 
against Zimmer’s budget reduction plan that called for HPD layoffs, Appellant’s Br. 21; 
(3) Falco’s forensic accountant’s report estimated that Falco’s damages resulting from 
Appellees’ retaliation amounted to approximately $1,000,000, excluding attorneys’ fees 
and costs; (4) Alicea testified that he targeted Falco for harassment to please Zimmer; 
(5) Falco has been prescribed medication to treat the anxiety he developed in the 
workplace; (6) Arch Liston (“Liston”), the former Business Administrator of Hoboken, 
testified in a Superior Court deposition that Falco should have received the same uniform 
allowance and attendance incentive as Police Superior Officers Association (“PSOA”) 
members; and (7) Falco continued to have police union dues deducted from his paycheck 
like other PSOA members, even after Appellees began withholding certain elements of 
his compensation.   
Falco himself “acknowledges that this [evidence], adduced either while discovery 
was proceeding in this action or in the related Superior Court action, was not part of the 
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record before the District Court below.”  Id. at n.5.  But he argues that, “in the interests of 
justice and fairness,” it is important to bring this particular evidence to our attention to 
demonstrate both the prematurity of dismissal and that the District Court incorrectly 
made factual inferences adverse to Falco.  Id.  Appellees respond by arguing that we 
should disregard Falco’s additional submissions because he never filed a motion to 
supplement the record on appeal.  Falco replies by citing case law that allegedly stands 
for the proposition that an appellate court may expand the record by taking judicial notice 
of new developments not considered by the lower court, as procedural rules are devised 
to promote justice.  We, however, decline to do so.     
As a general matter, as we have said on “numerous occasions,” we “cannot 
consider material on appeal that is outside of the district court record.”  In re Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 
1990) (collecting cases).  But this rule “is subject to the right of an appellate court in a 
proper case to take judicial notice of new developments not considered by the lower 
court.”  United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 966 n.26 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Landy v. 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 1973)).   
The proper process for expanding the record—beyond merely correcting errors or 
omissions—is through a motion for leave to supplement the record on appeal.  See Biliski 
v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 224 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009).  In 
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist such that such a motion should be 
granted, we consider:  
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(1) whether the proffered addition would establish beyond any doubt the 
proper resolution of the pending issue; (2) whether remanding the case to the 
district court for consideration of the additional material would be contrary 
to the interests of justice and the efficient use of judicial resources; and (3) 
whether the appeal arose in the context of a habeas corpus action. 
 
Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 226 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Capital Cities, 913 F.2d at 97).  But we need not exercise any such inherent 
equitable power to expand the record if a party has not sought leave to supplement the 
record.  Capital Cities, 913 F.2d at 97 (declining to expand the record beyond what the 
lower court considered where the appellant did not file a motion for leave to supplement 
the record on appeal). 
Here, Falco has not filed a motion for leave to supplement the record on appeal.  
As we did in Capital Cities, we therefore decline to expand the record by considering 
evidence that was not before the District Court.  Falco’s invocation of the principles of 
justice and fairness are to no avail where he has not followed the proper process.   
B. Falco States Some Plausible First Amendment Retaliation Claims 
 In its orders dismissing his second and fourth amended complaints, the District 
Court dismissed all of Falco’s First Amendment retaliation claims—the first time, some 
without prejudice and, the second time, all with prejudice.  However, our de novo review 
of Falco’s First Amendment retaliation claims demonstrates that portions of them must 






i. The District Court Incorrectly Articulated the Elements of a  
First Amendment Retaliation Claim by a Public Employee 
 
As an initial matter, the parties disagree on the elements of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim.  Relying on Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 
2006), Falco states that, in order to state a First Amendment retaliation claim, he must 
sufficiently allege two elements: that (1) the activity in question is protected by the First 
Amendment and (2) the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged 
retaliatory action.  Citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 
(3d Cir. 2007), and Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006), Appellees, 
on the other hand, state that Falco must allege three elements in order to state a valid First 
Amendment retaliation claim: that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) Appellees’ 
retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
rights, and (3) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the 
retaliatory action.   
Unfortunately, the parties talk past each other on this issue, never addressing the 
difference in stated elements and proving unhelpful when prompted at oral argument.  
The District Court, moreover, vacillated between the two articulations, employing 
Falco’s version in its opinion dismissing Falco’s second amended complaint but 
inexplicably changing course and employing Appellees’ version in its opinion dismissing 
Falco’s fourth amended complaint.   
A review of our jurisprudence on such claims reveals that the District Court was 
correct in the first instance and incorrect in the second instance: Falco’s, not Appellees’, 
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version of the elements is applicable here because Falco was a public employee when he 
experienced the alleged First Amendment retaliation.  DeFlaminis, the primary case 
Appellees cite in support of their position, concerned private citizens who brought a First 
Amendment retaliation claim against a government entity and its employees.  480 F.3d at 
263–65, 267 (articulating Appellees’ version of the elements for a First Amendment 
retaliation claim where parents brought suit against a school district, superintendent, and 
director of pupil services).  In contrast, Hill, the sole case Falco cites in support of his 
position, concerned a public employee who brought a First Amendment retaliation claim 
against his public employer.  455 F.3d at 230, 241 (articulating Falco’s version of the 
elements for a First Amendment retaliation claim where a former borough manager 
brought suit against a borough and its former mayor).  Indeed, our prior decisions 
demonstrate that Falco’s articulation of the elements is correct where a First Amendment 
retaliation claim is brought by a public employee, whereas Appellees’ version is 
appropriate where such a claim is brought by a private citizen.  Compare De Ritis v. 
McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 453 n.5 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying Falco’s formulation to a 
public employee’s case), Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 466 (3d Cir. 
2015) (same), Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (same), 
Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2009) (same), and Ambrose v. Twp. of 
Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002) (same) with Thomas, 463 F.3d at 296 
(applying Appellees’ formulation to a private citizen’s case), and Mitchell v. Horn, 318 
F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (same).   
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Because the claims in the instant case arise out of Falco’s former position as Chief 
of the HPD—in which even Appellees concede he was a public employee—Falco’s 
articulation of the elements controls here.  Though, in their application, both iterations of 
the elements boil down to similar core considerations, we proceed with Falco’s version in 
light of the above discussion.  
That said, Falco’s version of the elements is still incomplete.  More fully, “[t]o 
establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must show that (1) his 
[activity] is protected by the First Amendment and (2) the [activity] was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action, which, if both are proved, shifts the 
burden to the employer to prove that (3) the same action would have been taken even if 
the [activity] had not occurred.”  Munroe, 805 F.3d at 466 (quoting Dougherty, 772 F.3d 
at 986); accord Gorum, 561 F.3d at 184 (articulating the same elements for other types of 
First Amendment activity, not just speech).  “The first factor is a question of law; the 
second factor is a question of fact.”  Gorum, 561 F.3d at 184 (quoting Hill, 455 F.3d at 
241).  
ii. Falco Has Waived First Amendment Retaliation Claims Arising from His Associations 
 Throughout the various stages of this litigation, including now on appeal, Falco 
has alleged a panoply of protected activities.  As an initial matter, however, we must 
review the procedural history of this case to discern which of the alleged activities are 
still potentially viable.   
As background, Falco’s second amended complaint stated eight counts of First 
Amendment retaliation.  Those counts were each generically titled “Violation of 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983 – First Amendment” but, in the text of each count, Falco alleged violations 
of both his First Amendment free speech and association rights.  App. 121–27.  In its 
order dismissing the second amended complaint, the District Court dismissed all but two 
of those counts with prejudice.  Falco refiled those latter two claims in his third amended 
complaint, where they were titled “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Freedom of Speech” 
and “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Freedom of Religion,” respectively.  Id. at 158–59.  
Again, the District Court dismissed the third amended complaint, this time dismissing all 
of Falco’s claims without prejudice.  Subsequently, Falco filed his fourth amended 
complaint—the live, operative complaint as to his First Amendment retaliation claims—
which includes a sole count titled “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983—First Amendment 
(Free Speech).”  Id. at 173.   
Whereas the second and third amended complaints explicitly pled and plentifully 
referenced free association claims, e.g., id. at 122 (“[Appellees’] actions . . . violated the 
rights . . . guaranteed to [Falco] . . . including without limitation the right to free speech 
and association (emphasis added)); id. at 157 (“[Hoboken’s] decision . . . is the latest 
example of [Appellees’] . . . retaliatory and unlawful acts against []Falco for, among 
other things, his political speech and associations . . . .”), the fourth amended complaint 
contains only few, passing mentions to such claims, see id. 172–212 (only once 
referencing “associations,” but only in explaining Falco’s political background, and 
rarely referencing “affiliations,” only in passing).  More importantly, by its own 
language—and as Falco’s counsel conceded at oral argument, see Oral Arg. Audio 
47:50–48:00—the fourth amended complaint only alleges a single count of First 
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Amendment free speech retaliation.  Falco has therefore abandoned any free association 
claim.      
Yet, on appeal, Falco presses claims for both “protected speech and association” 
retaliation.  Appellant’s Br. 20.  At oral argument, Falco’s counsel seemed to overlook 
these pleading deficiencies, seeking to revive, among others, “all of the First Amendment 
[retaliation] claims in the second amended complaint.”  Oral Arg. Audio 47:02–47:29.  
But that he cannot do because the free association claims Falco made in his second 
amended complaint were dismissed by the District Court without prejudice but Falco did 
not replead them in his fourth amended complaint.  See Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space 
Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 973 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[Plaintiff] originally brought a 
claim for equitable indemnity, which the district court dismissed with leave to amend.  
Because [Plaintiff] did not voluntarily renew these claims, however, it effectively 
abandoned them.” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Shakeri v. ADT Sec. Servs., 
Inc., 816 F.3d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that “a failure to replead claims after 
being granted leave to replead constitutes waiver of any such claims on appeal” (citations 
omitted)).   
Consequently, we cannot review any of Falco’s alleged instances of protected 
activity for potential protected association.  Instead, Falco is bound by the terminology he 
used in the operative fourth amended complaint, which plainly alleges a sole count for 





iii. Falco Successfully Pleads That He Engaged  
in Some First Amendment Protected Speech 
 
a. Relevant Law 
As a general rule, a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment 
“when (1) in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen[;] (2) the statement involved a 
matter of public concern[;] and (3) the government employer did not have ‘an adequate 
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general 
public’ as a result of the statement he made.”  Hill, 455 F.3d 241–42 (quoting Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).  A public employee does not speak “as [a] citizen[]” 
when he makes a statement “pursuant to [his] official duties.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined 
by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”  
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1987) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 147–48 (1983)). 
1. Private Citizen or Public Employee 
Whether Falco acted as a private citizen or a public employee for purposes of his 
speech turns on whether he engaged in the relevant activity pursuant to his job duties in 
the HPD.  In order to be protected by the First Amendment, a plaintiff’s activity 
ordinarily must not have been undertaken pursuant to his job responsibilities as a public 
employee.  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (citation omitted).  Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court has not “articulate[d] a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an 
employee’s duties,” but it has stressed:  
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The proper inquiry is a practical one.  Formal job descriptions often bear 
little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform, 
and the listing of a given task in an employee’s written job description is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is 
within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment 
purposes. 
 
Id. at 424–25. 
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court explained that “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline.”  Id. at 421.  That case concerned a deputy district attorney 
who wrote a dispositional memorandum in which he recommended dismissing a 
prosecution based on an improper search warrant.  Id. at 414–15.  The district court there 
had concluded that, because the statements were made pursuant to the prosecutor’s 
official job duties, they were not protected speech.  Id. at 415.  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the speech was inherently a matter of public concern and that it did 
not unduly disrupt the operations of the prosecutor’s office.  Id. at 415–16.   
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that courts must first 
inquire as to whether a public employee spoke as a citizen or in his role as an employee.  
Id. at 417–18.  The Supreme Court stressed that whether the speech at issue “concern[s] 
the subject matter of [the speaker’s] employment” is “nondispositive,” because the First 
Amendment “protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.”  Id. at 421 
(citations omitted).  Instead, the “controlling factor” is whether the statements were 
“made pursuant to [the speaker’s] duties,” that is, whether such utterances were among 
21 
 
the things that the employee “was employed to do.”  Id.  Applying the law to the facts 
before it, the Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s preparing the memorandum at 
issue constituted unprotected public employee speech because it was made in the course 
of his ordinary job responsibilities.  Id. at 424.   
In Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, we applied Garcetti in determining whether a 
police officer’s participation, including trial testimony, in investigations against his 
superiors was speech protected by the First Amendment.  532 F.3d 216, 219, 225 (3d Cir. 
2008).  We held there that, when testifying truthfully in court proceedings, a public 
employee speaks as a citizen, even if the court testimony stems from the employee’s 
official duties in an investigation.  Id. at 231 (“[T]he act of offering truthful testimony is 
the responsibility of every citizen, and the First Amendment protection associated with 
fulfilling that duty of citizenship is not vitiated by one’s status as a public employee.  
That an employee’s official responsibilities provided the initial impetus to appear in court 
is immaterial to his/her independent obligation as a citizen to testify truthfully.”). 
In Lane v. Franks, the Supreme Court endorsed Reilly.  See 573 U.S. 228, 235 
(2014).  That case concerned the director of a community college program who was 
terminated for providing truthful, sworn testimony under subpoena to a grand jury 
regarding another public employee he had terminated for fraud, even though the 
testimony concerned matters related to the director’s job.  Id. at 232–34.  In deciding that 
the public employee’s speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, the Supreme 
Court clarified that “[t]he critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is 
itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns 
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those duties.”  Id. at 240 (emphasis added).  Motivated by the “considerable value” in 
“encouraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by public employees,” id. at 236, the 
Supreme Court held that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside 
the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment 
purposes, . . . even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns 
information learned during that employment.”  Id. at 238.  But the Supreme Court 
reserved the question of whether this would also be true for testimony given as “part of a 
public employee’s ordinary job duties.”  Id. at n.4.   
In sum, if a public employee’s speech is part of his ordinary job duties, the 
employee is acting as a public employee and his activity is thus not protected under the 
First Amendment.  If, however, the public employee’s speech is not part of his ordinary 
job duties or is uttered as sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding, then the employee is 
acting as a private citizen and his speech hence may or may not be protected under the 
First Amendment, depending on the second step of the analysis. 
2. Public Concern or Private Concern 
Assuming Falco acted as a private citizen, whether his speech is protected under 
the First Amendment next turns on whether or not the activity involved a matter of public 
concern or private concern.  Whereas a public employee’s speech involving matters of 
public concern are protected, speech involving matters of private concern are not 
protected.  See De Ritis, 861 F.3d at 454–55 (citations omitted).  
Activity involves matters of public concern “when it can ‘be fairly considered as 
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it 
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‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value 
and concern to the public.’”  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (citations 
omitted).  By contrast, activity does not involve a matter of public concern when it relates 
solely to “mundane employment grievances.”  Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467 (citation 
omitted).  Courts determine whether an employee’s speech involves public concern by 
reference to the speech’s “content, form, and context,” Lane, 573 U.S. at 241 (quoting 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48), which encompasses “the employee’s motivation as well as 
whether it is important to our system of self-government that the expression take place,” 
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467 (citations omitted).   
Because courts are not to “make a superficial characterization of the speech or 
activity taken as a whole,” they must conduct “a particularized examination of each 
activity for which the protection of the First Amendment is claimed” to determine 
whether it involves a matter of public concern, Johnson v. Lincoln Univ. of 
Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 776 F.2d 443, 451 (3d Cir. 1985), while taking care 
not to “‘cherry pick’ something that may impact the public while ignoring [its] manner 
and context,” Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467 (citation omitted).  If, for example, a discrete unit 
of speech addresses only the employee’s own problems and, even if those problems 
“brush ever so gently against a matter of public concern” by virtue of that employee’s 
public employment, then that speech is merely a “personal grievance.”  Miller v. Clinton 
Cty., 544 F.3d 542, 551 (3d Cir. 2008). 
In Connick, the Supreme Court first ruled that it is “unnecessary . . . to scrutinize 
the reasons” for alleged retaliation if a public employee’s activity “cannot be fairly 
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characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.”  461 U.S. at 146.  
That case concerned an assistant district attorney who was fired when, after a forced 
transfer, she circulated a questionnaire to other employees regarding the transfer policy, 
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, 
and whether employees felt pressured to work on political campaigns.  Id. at 140–41.  
Recognizing that “government offices could not function if every employment decision 
became a constitutional matter,” id. at 143, the Supreme Court stated that federal courts 
have a responsibility to “ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by 
virtue of working for the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for 
employee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment . . . .”  Id. at 147.  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the survey questions—except one asking about 
feeling pressure to work on political campaigns—were not protected speech because they 
involved a personal grievance rather than a matter of public concern.  Id. at 148.   
More recently, in Lane, the Supreme Court determined that a public employee’s 
testimony regarding corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds “obviously 
involve[d] a matter of significant public concern.”  573 U.S. at 241 (citing Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 425).  According to the Supreme Court, “the form and context of the speech—
sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding—fortif[ied] that conclusion.”  Id.  
Our and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is replete with cases concerning 
criticism of public employers by public employees.  See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968); Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1983).  
Collectively, these cases indicate that “speech disclosing public officials’ misfeasance is 
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protected while speech intended to air personal grievances is not.”  Swineford v. Snyder 
Cty. Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 1271 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 103).  
In sum, if a public employee’s speech (1) is not part of his ordinary job duties or 
concerns speech uttered but (2) does not involve a matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community, the speech is not protected under the First Amendment.  If, 
however, the speech (1) is not part of the public employee’s ordinary job duties or is 
uttered as sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding and (2) involves a matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community, the speech may be protected under the First 
Amendment, depending on the third and final step of the analysis.  
3. Public Employer Lacks or Has Adequate Justification 
Assuming Falco spoke as a private citizen and his activity addressed a matter of 
public concern, we must determine whether or not Appellees had an adequate 
justification for treating Falco differently from any other member of the general public.  
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).  In conducting this step of 
the analysis, courts balance “the public employee’s interest in speaking about a matter of 
public concern and the value to the community of [his] being free to speak on such 
matters” against “the government’s interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of 
the services it performs through its employees.”  Azzaro v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 
968, 980 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Green v. Phila. Housing Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 
1997); Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 891–92 (3d Cir. 1995); and Versarge v. 
Twp. of Clinton, N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993)); accord Brennan v. Norton, 
350 F.3d 399, 413 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that courts should “consider the nature of 
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the relationship between the employee and the employer as well as any disruption the 
employee’s speech may cause, including the impact of the speech on the employer’s 
ability to maintain discipline and relationships in the work place” (citation omitted)); 
Baldassare v. State of N.J., 250 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he public’s interest in 
exposing potential wrongdoing by public employees is especially powerful.”).  If the 
public employer’s interest is “significantly greater” than the public employee’s interest in 
contributing to public debate, then the public employee’s speech is not protected.  De 
Ritis, 861 F.3d at 456–57 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573).  
In Pickering, the Supreme Court held that a public school teacher’s letter to the 
editor of a local newspaper concerning a school budget constituted speech on a matter of 
public concern.  391 U.S. at 571, 574–75.  In balancing the public employee’s interest in 
such speech against the government’s efficiency interest, the Supreme Court declared that 
the publication of the letter did not “impede[] the teacher’s proper performance of his 
daily duties in the classroom” or “interfere[] with the regular operation of the schools 
generally.”  Id. at 572–73.  The Supreme Court therefore held that the teacher’s speech 
was protected under the First Amendment and thus could not serve as the basis for his 
dismissal.  Id. at 574. 
 In sum, if a public employee’s speech (1) is not part of his ordinary job duties or is 
uttered as sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding and (2) involves a matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community but (3) the government’s interest in promoting 
the efficiency of its services is significantly greater than the employee’s interest in 
speaking about the matter and the value to the community of his being able to do so, then 
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the speech is not protected under the First Amendment.  If, however, the speech (1) is not 
part of his ordinary job duties or is uttered as sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding, 
(2) involves a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, and (3) the 
government’s interest in promoting the efficiency of its services is not significantly 
greater than the employee’s interest in speaking about the matter and the value to the 
community of his being able to do so, then the speech is protected under the First 
Amendment.   
b. Application 
 In light of this relevant law, some but not all of Falco’s alleged instances of 
protected speech satisfy the first element of a plausible First Amendment retaliation 
claim.  In particular, three of Falco’s ten examples of allegedly protected speech are 
indeed protected under the First Amendment.  The remaining seven, however, fall by the 
wayside.  Here, we review all ten instances of allegedly protected speech in chronological 
order, individually clarifying which are and are not protected under the law.   
1. Membership in Old Hoboken 
 First, Falco offers his membership in Old Hoboken as an instance of protected 
activity.  But this is a non-starter since group membership is a matter of association.  See 
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1973) (citations omitted).  Because, as 
previously discussed, we are precluded from reviewing Falco’s allegations for protected 





2. Political Support for Zimmer’s Opponents 
 Second, Falco points to his support for Cammarano and other political rivals of 
Zimmer in municipal elections of 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 as instances of protected 
activity.  Specifically, in his fourth amended complaint, Falco alleges that he 
“supported . . . Cammarano . . . by attending public and private political events including, 
but not limited to, fundraisers, strategy sessions, and reaching out to communities near 
[Falco’s] residence by going door-to-door in vocal support of Cammarano and his 
running-mates.”  App. 177 (emphasis added).  He also alleges that he generally 
“support[ed] . . . political rivals of []Zimmer, both before and during her service as 
Mayor and his as Chief.”  Id. at 175.  
 Falco must first allege that he engaged in the activity as a private citizen, not as a 
public employee.  Although Falco does not explicitly allege that supporting political 
candidates is outside the ordinary job duties of his former positions in the HPD, we must 
here draw a reasonable inference in Falco’s favor: supporting political candidates is 
presumably outside the ordinary job duties of HPD officers.  Falco therefore overcomes 
the first step of the analysis, as he engaged in the activity as a private citizen instead of as 
a public employee. 
 Falco must next allege that this activity involved a matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community.  Supporting political candidates in municipal elections is 
squarely within these parameters.  Thus, Falco overcomes the second step of the analysis, 
as he engaged in activity of public, not private, concern. 
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 Falco must finally allege that Appellees did not have an adequate justification to 
treat him differently than any other member of the general public.  Unfortunately, neither 
the parties nor the District Court discussed this component of classifying public employee 
activity as free speech.  Instead, the District Court perfunctorily assumed this activity 
constituted protected speech and the parties elide the complexities of the issue in their 
briefs.  We, hence, must draw reasonable inferences in Falco’s favor here.   
As an initial matter, political participation is a quintessential civic duty, giving 
substantial weight to Falco’s side of the test.  Moreover, restricting public employees 
from engaging politically is contrary to bedrock principles of civic society—and, more 
relevant here, does not seem to promote the efficiency of government services.  At the 
very least, we cannot say that Appellees’ interest in promoting their services’ efficiency 
significantly outweighs Falco’s interest in engaging politically and the community’s 
interest in having citizens, especially community leaders, be politically active.  
Consequently, Falco’s support of Cammarano and other political rivals of Zimmer in 
municipal elections properly classifies as protected First Amendment activity. 
3. Report to Hudson County Prosecutor 
 Third, Falco offers his report against Zimmer administration officials to the 
Hudson County Prosecutor in June 2010 as an instance of protected activity.  In the 
report, Falco chronicled the Department of Public Safety’s various forms of interference 
in the HPD and sought advice moving forward.  In order for this activity to be protected, 
Falco must first allege that he engaged in it as a private citizen, not as a public employee.  
In the absence of Falco’s explicitly alleging that reporting other officials in government is 
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outside the ordinary job duties of the Chief of the HPD, we are once more left to our own 
devices.   
Here, we cannot reasonably draw the inference that reporting allegedly improper 
interference in the HPD is outside the Chief of Police’s responsibilities.  Indeed, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-118, which Falco claims Appellees’ interference violated, itself 
states that the “[C]hief of [P]olice . . . shall be the head of the police force and that he 
shall be directly responsible to the appropriate authority for the efficiency and routine 
day[-]to[-]day operations thereof . . . pursuant to policies established by the appropriate 
authority.”  It would not make sense for, on the one hand, the Chief of Police to be in 
charge of running the day-to-day operations of the HPD based on the policies established 
by appropriate authorities but, on the other hand, it be outside his job responsibilities to 
inquire from an appropriate authority as to how he should respond to perceived 
interference with his exclusive role.  This activity can be reasonably interpreted only as 
one squarely within Falco’s ordinary job duties.  As a result, this activity is unprotected 
under the First Amendment. 
4. Opposition to Zimmer’s Budget Reduction Plan 
Fourth, Falco points to his opposition to Zimmer’s budget reduction plan that 
called for HPD layoffs, including speaking against the plan at a meeting with Zimmer in 
July 2010 and at a Hoboken City Council meeting in September 2010, as further 
instances of protected activity.  But again, Falco does not allege that his opposition was 
outside his ordinary job duties and we cannot reasonably infer that it was.  For one, 
Zimmer explicitly asked Falco to provide an HPD budget that could reduce costs by $2 
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million.  Moreover, he articulated his opposition to Zimmer’s budget reduction plan in 
documents he sent to her and other municipal staff in March and July 2010.  Lastly, he 
spoke against the plan at a Hoboken City Council meeting attended by “hundreds of HPD 
officers and officers’ family members.”  App. 193.  Because Falco seemingly acted 
within his ordinary job duties in opposing Zimmer’s budget reduction plan, we cannot 
deem this instance as constituting protected speech activity.  
5. Association with OLG and Appointment of Santora 
Fifth, Falco offers his association with OLG and appointment of Santora to be 
Chaplain of the HPD in 2010 as protected activity.  But neither instance passes muster.  
First, as discussed previously, we cannot review Falco’s allegations regarding his 
associations, including those with OLG.  Second, Falco’s appointment of Santora as 
Chaplain was certainly within Falco’s job duties as a public employee.  Falco concedes as 
much when, in his fourth amended complaint, he states: “As Chief of Police, [Falco] 
named . . . Santora to be the Chaplain of [the] HPD in or about 2010.”  Id. at 195.  This 
statement must be interpreted to mean that Falco appointed Santora to the position as part 
of his official duties as Chief of the HPD.  Hence, because Falco engaged in the activity 
as a public employee, he cannot obtain First Amendment protection for it.  
6. Arrest of Sacs after Altercation 
Sixth, Falco points to the arrest of Sacs by his daughter, an HPD officer, as 
another instance of protected activity.  However, Falco cannot seek free speech protection 
for this activity for at least two reasons.  First, Falco does not allege that he, himself, 
engaged in the activity; instead, he articulates that the arrest was effected only by his 
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daughter.  But, even assuming that making an arrest somehow qualifies as speech, one 
cannot claim First Amendment protection for the speech of another.  See Easton v. 
Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1015 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[Plaintiff’s] claim thus fails at the outset 
because he himself has not engaged in conduct deserving of [F]irst [A]mendment 
protection . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Second, drawing reasonable inferences in Falco’s 
favor, we must still conclude that effectuating arrests is squarely within the job 
parameters of the Chief of Police.  For these two independent reasons, we cannot 
consider this to be an activity protected under the First Amendment.     
7. Initiation of the Instant Lawsuit 
Seventh, Falco offers his initiating this lawsuit in March 2013 as an instance of 
protected speech activity.  As a threshold matter, we must determine whether this activity 
properly qualifies as speech, to which our review in this case is limited.  Generally, the 
act of suing a public employer may fall under either the Speech Clause or Petition Clause 
of the First Amendment, as the two clauses embody “cognate rights.”  Borough of 
Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 530 (1945)).  The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that filing a lawsuit 
qualifies as speech if a plaintiff “allege[s] that his employer retaliated against him for the 
speech contained within his . . . lawsuit.”  Id. at 387.  Here, Falco has done just that by 
alleging that Appellees retaliated against him for, among other things, the “numerous 
allegations of unlawful, unconstitutional, and retaliatory behavior” by Appellees set forth 
in his “initial complaint.”  App. 204, 206.  In any event, Appellees do not contest that 
Falco’s filing this lawsuit constitutes speech activity.   
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Although Appellees also do not contest that this activity constitutes protected 
speech, we nonetheless undertake the full analysis.  As to the first step of the analysis, we 
can reasonably infer that Falco’s filing this action was not within his ordinary job 
responsibilities, especially in light of Supreme Court precedent on the subject.  Cf. Lane, 
573 U.S. at 238 (“Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of 
speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, 
to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.” (citations omitted)).  As to the second 
step of the analysis, we must determine whether filing the instant case involved a matter 
of public concern.  Here again, our precedent supports Falco’s position.  See Green, 105 
F.3d at 888 (“[A]ll court appearances are matters of public concern.  That is so because 
all court appearances implicate the public’s interest in the integrity of the truth seeking 
process and the effective administration of justice.”).   
The final step calls for balancing Appellees’ interest in ensuring the efficiency of 
their services against Falco’s interest in accessing the courts and the community’s value 
in allowing all aggrieved parties to seek legal redress.  Again, the parties have not briefed 
this issue so we must draw reasonable inferences on our own.  But it appears that Falco 
has a strong interest in vindicating his constitutional rights whereas Appellees, at best, 
have an interest in ensuring the efficient operation of the Hoboken government, in which 
lawsuits such as Falco’s could pose burdens.   
In Green, we determined that a housing authority police officer’s First 
Amendment interest in testifying as a character witness for an organized crime associate 
was outweighed by the housing authority’s interest in successfully fighting drugs and 
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crime, protecting the safety of its officers and other members of the community, fostering 
trust and confidence among officers, and protecting its reputation.  Id. at 887–89.  Here, 
by contrast, Appellees have stated no justification for treating Falco differently than any 
ordinary member of the public.  Unarmed with any such justifications and nonetheless 
bound to draw reasonable inferences in Falco’s favor, we must thus determine that, on 
balance, Falco’s interests are stronger.  Therefore, Falco’s initiation of the instant lawsuit 
constitutes speech protected under the First Amendment. 
8. Assignment of Ferrante to Night Shift 
Eighth, Falco points to his decision to assign Ferrante to a nighttime shift in 
October 2013 as an additional instance of protected activity.  But this activity cannot 
overcome the first step of the requisite analysis.  Although Falco has not alleged whether 
shift decisions are within or outside his ordinary job responsibilities, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40A:14-118 sheds light on this matter.  The statute’s plain language denotes that the 
Chief of Police is “directly responsible” for the “routine day[-]to[-]day operations” of the 
HPD.  Id.  Personnel management is clearly within the parameters of routine, day-to-day 
operations.  We can thus reasonably infer only that Falco engaged in this activity as a 
public employee, rendering it unprotected under the First Amendment. 
9. Testimony in Alicea 
Ninth, Falco avers that his testimony pursuant to a subpoena in his official 
capacity as Chief of Police in Alicea, where he was questioned at length about his 
allegations in the instant lawsuit, is another instance of protected activity.  At first blush, 
determining whether such testimony classifies as protected speech activity seems murky 
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in light of Garcetti.  Although Garcetti broadly proclaimed that statements by public 
employees pursuant to their official duties are not protected by the First Amendment, 547 
U.S. at 421, Lane narrowed its bounds, 573 U.S. at 239–41.  In particular, Lane 
distinguished sworn testimony in judicial proceedings, the speech at issue there, as being 
“far removed” from the contents of office memoranda, the speech at issue in Garcetti.  Id. 
at 239.  On this basis, Lane specifically held that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a 
public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for 
First Amendment purposes . . . even when the testimony relates to [the] public 
employment or concerns information learned during that employment.”  Id. at 238.  Still, 
it reserved the question of whether this is also true for testimony given as “part of a 
public employee’s ordinary job duties.”  Id. at n.4.    
Our jurisprudence, however, has already answered that question.  In Reilly, we 
held that a public employee speaks as a citizen when testifying truthfully in court 
proceedings, even if the court testimony stems from his official duties.  532 F.3d at 231.  
Nothing in Lane disturbs this.2   
                                              
2 Indeed, albeit in dicta, Lane supports this proposition:   
 
Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of 
speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears 
an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.  When the 
person testifying is a public employee, he may bear separate obligations to 
his employer—for example, an obligation not to show up to court dressed in 
an unprofessional manner.  But any such obligations as an employee are 
distinct and independent from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth.  
That independent obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and 




As a result, the factual dispute over whether Falco’s testimony in Alicea was 
within his ordinary job duties as Chief of the HPD is of no moment.  Either way, Falco’s 
testimony qualifies as citizen speech.  We must therefore continue to consider the next 
steps of the protected activity analysis.    
Falco’s testimony in Alicea also satisfies the second step of the analysis.  The 
content of Falco’s testimony—alleged discrimination and retaliation by Zimmer and 
Hoboken—clearly involves a matter of significant public concern.  See Swineford, 15 
F.3d at 1271 (articulating that “speech disclosing public officials’ misfeasance is 
protected” (citing Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 103)); see also Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 
(explaining that speech involves a matter of public concern when “it is a subject of 
legitimate news interest” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  Moreover, 
“the form and context of the speech—sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding—fortify 
that conclusion.”  Lane, 573 U.S. at 241.   
Finally, Falco’s Alicea testimony survives the analysis’ third step.  Here, we must 
decide whether Appellees “had an adequate justification for treating [Falco] differently 
from any other member of the general public” based on their needs as employers.  
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).  But Appellees’ side of the 
Pickering scale is entirely empty.  Like the public employer in Lane, Appellees “do not 
assert, and cannot demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance in their 
favor.  There is no evidence, for example, that [Falco’s] testimony . . . was false or 
                                              
573 U.S. at 238–39 (internal citations omitted).   
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erroneous or that [Falco] unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, or privileged 
information while testifying.”  Lane, 573 U.S. at 242.  Having satisfied each step of the 
analysis, Falco’s testimony in Alicea is therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.  
10. Refusal to Allow Interference with HPD 
Tenth, Falco points to his refusal to countenance interference from civilian 
employees, especially those aligned with Zimmer, in the day-to-day operations of the 
HPD as a final instance of protected activity.  But this activity is unprotected under the 
First Amendment for the same reason Falco’s report of Zimmer administration officials 
to the Hudson County Prosecutor is unprotected.  As discussed previously, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 40A:14-118 places responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the HPD 
directly on the shoulders of the Chief of Police.  It would not follow for the Chief to be in 
charge of running the day-to-day operations of the HPD but it not be within his ordinary 
job duties to prevent others from interfering in the day-to-day operations of the HPD.  
This activity can thus can be reasonably interpreted as one within Falco’s ordinary job 
duties.  Because of this, it is unprotected under the First Amendment.  
* * * 
 Overall, only three of Falco’s offered activities—(1) his vocal support for political 
opponents of Zimmer in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013; (2) his filing the instant lawsuit in 
March 2013; and (3) his testimony in Alicea in December 2013—are protected by the 




iv. Falco Successfully Pleads That Some of His First Amendment Protected Speech Was 
a Substantial or Motivating Factor in Some of Appellees’ Allegedly Retaliatory Acts 
 
a. Relevant Law 
Having established that he engaged in at least some First Amendment protected 
activity, Falco next bears the burden of showing that his protected activity was a 
substantial or motivating factor in Appellees’ alleged retaliation.  To do so, he must show 
some sort of “causal link” between the protected speech and the adverse employment 
action.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citations omitted); see also Azzaro, 110 F.3d at 981 (reversing summary judgment 
dismissing First Amendment retaliation claim because there existed “a material dispute of 
fact as to whether [plaintiff’s] reports were a motivating factor in the discharge 
decision”).   
Generally, this element “presents a question of fact for the jury.”  McGreevy v. 
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2005).  But, at this motion to dismiss stage, Falco 
must only produce some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of this element that is 
“enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 
(citation omitted).   
 The adverse action must be more than de minimis.  See McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 
165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[N]ot every critical comment—or series of comments—made 
by an employer to an employee provides a basis for a colorable allegation that the 
employee has been deprived of his or her constitutional rights.” (citations omitted)).  
However, “a plaintiff may be able to establish liability under § 1983 based upon a 
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continuing course of conduct even though some or all of the conduct complained of 
would be de minimis by itself or if viewed in isolation.”  Brennan, 350 F.3d at 419 n.16; 
accord Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] trier of fact could 
determine that a violation of the First Amendment occurred at the time of the rankings on 
the promotion lists and that some relief is appropriate even if plaintiffs cannot prove a 
causal connection between the rankings and the failure to promote.”).  In cases where the 
parties dispute whether an actionable adverse action occurred, the factfinder must 
determine whether “the alleged retaliatory conduct was sufficient ‘to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness’ from exercising his First Amendment rights.”  Suppan, 203 F.3d at 
235 (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)); accord O’Connor v. 
City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127–28 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
 “[F]or protected conduct to be a substantial or motivating factor in a decision, the 
decisionmakers must be aware of the protected conduct.”  Ambrose, 303 F.3d at 493 
(citation omitted).  If Falco shows that Appellees were aware of the protected conduct, 
then he may use the temporal proximity between that knowledge and the adverse 
employment action to argue causation.  “[A] suggestive temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action can be probative of causation,” Town 
of Hammonton, 351 F.3d at 114 (citation omitted), but “[e]ven if timing alone could ever 
be sufficient to establish a causal link, . . . the timing of the alleged retaliatory action 
must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of retaliatory motive before a causal link will be 
inferred,”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Krouse 
v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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That said, in order to show that the protected speech was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the alleged acts of retaliation, Falco need not show that the decision 
was motivated solely by anti-speech animus or even that the illegal animus was the 
dominant or primary motivation for the retaliation.  Suppan, 203 F.3d at 236 (citing Vill. 
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)).  This is less 
than a showing that Falco’s protected conduct was the “but for” cause of the challenged 
actions.  Id.  
In DeFlaminis, a case involving retaliation claims under both the First 
Amendment and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797b, we noted three 
options for proving a sufficient causal link: 
To establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff usually must prove 
either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected 
activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism 
coupled with timing to establish a causal link. . . .  In the absence of that proof 
the plaintiff must show [(3)] that from the evidence gleaned from the record 
as a whole the trier of the fact should infer causation. 
 
480 F.3d at 267 (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
 Overall, distilling the several, aforementioned considerations as to this second 
element of a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, we now review Falco’s 
allegations of Appellees’ retaliation for the following components: that (1) Appellees 
were aware of Falco’s protected speech; (2) Appellees’ acts of retaliation were not de 
minimis, but instead sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
First Amendment rights; and (3) there exists a sufficient causal link between the 




 As a threshold matter, Falco posits that he is not required to show any proof of 
causation at this stage of the proceedings.  But the cases on which Falco relies concern 
Title VII retaliation claims, not First Amendment retaliation claims.  See Connelly v. 
Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 785 (3d Cir. 2016); Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., 
Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., Red Arrow 
Div., 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1993).  Although the two contexts are similar, the 
elements of retaliation claims under the two laws differ.  As a result, Falco must show a 
plausible causal connection at this stage.  
Falco, however, offers a hodgepodge of retaliatory acts, largely without tying any 
specific act to any particular protected activity.  Construing the facts in Falco’s favor, we 
must therefore parse through the record to determine whether any of these protected 
activities were a substantial or motivating factor in any of Appellees’ allegedly retaliatory 
acts.  But cf. Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 403–04 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(explaining that courts are not obliged to comb through the entire case, including many 
briefs and motions, to ferret out factual matters).  We assess here each alleged retaliatory 
act in turn.    
1. Interference in HPD’s Routine Operations 
 First, Falco presents Zimmer and her allies’ interference in the day-to-day 
operations of the HPD from fall 2009 to fall 2011 as retaliatory acts for which his First 
Amendment protected activities were a substantial or motivating factor.  By that point, 
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Falco had neither filed this lawsuit nor testified in Alicea, so only his political support for 
political opponents of Zimmer could have formed the impetus for the alleged retaliation.   
 While Falco’s allegations satisfy the first and third component considerations as to 
this element, they do not fulfill the second.  Falco alleges that he publicly supported 
political opponents of Zimmer in an array of campaign activities, from fundraisers to 
door to door canvassing.  It is reasonable for us to infer that Appellees would have 
learned of this, especially in light of the controversy surrounding Falco’s appointment as 
Chief of Police at the time.  See App. 179 (alleging that Zimmer opposed Falco’s 
candidacy for Chief of Police “because [he] supported her political rivals”).  Falco’s first 
relevant engagement in this protected activity—in the spring and fall of 2009—also 
occurred in temporal proximity to when Appellees began interfering in the HPD.   
 But Falco’s claim falters at the second stage.  As explained previously, whether a 
retaliatory act is de minimis turns on whether it would be sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.  Falco here generally 
alleges that Appellees’ interference—through, among other things, their disclosure of 
confidential police information to civilians, an inquiry into an internal HPD investigation, 
the filing of an OPRA request into the HPD, and requests for the HPD’s roll calls—was 
substantial.  But the District Court held it to be de minimis.  
We agree with the District Court’s determination. We deem interference by filing 
formal inquiries and requests more akin to “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple 
lack of good manners,” which are not actionable in an analogous legal context, 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006), than retaliation that 
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would deter an ordinary person from speaking out.  We therefore conclude that Falco has 
not shown that his support of political opponents of Zimmer was a substantial or 
motivating factor in Appellees’ interference in the day-to-day operations of the HPD.  
2. Cancellation of St. Patrick’s Day Parade 
Second, Falco presents Zimmer’s cancellation of the 2012 Saint Patrick’s Day 
Parade as “[r]etaliation for [Falco’s] [m]embership in [OLG and] [s]upport of []Santora.”  
App. 194.  Here, Falco points to a particular activity that he believes caused this alleged 
retaliation.  In doing so, however, Falco illuminates a fatal flaw in this claim.  As 
discussed previously, only retaliation claims relating to Falco’s speech, not associations, 
are viable in this case at this point.  We must therefore disregard such passing references 
to Falco’s associations.  Nonetheless, even if we are to construe this as a speech-related 
claim arising out of Falco’s appointment of Santora as Chaplain, for the same reasons 
explained before, that appointment is not a protected activity because it was within 
Falco’s ordinary job duties in the HPD.  Accordingly, Falco’s second instance of claimed 
retaliation is also unavailing. 
3. Denial of Written Contract 
 Third, Falco points to Appellees’ denial of his request for a written contract in 
2012 as a retaliatory act for which his First Amendment protected activities were a 
substantial or motivating factor.  At the time Appellees denied Falco’s request for a 
written contract, the only protected activity in which Falco had engaged was his support 
for political opponents of Zimmer.  This protected activity began in 2009, nearly three 
years before he alleges Appellees retaliated against him.  The lapse of several years 
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between Falco’s first engagement in the activity and Appellees’ alleged retaliation fatally 
attenuates the causal connection between the two.  Falco attempts to rehabilitate this 
temporal gap by pointing to the fact that Hoboken was under a state fiscal monitor at the 
beginning of his tenure as Chief of Police, thereby limiting Appellees’ freedom to 
retaliate against him by denying him a contract.  But Falco himself concedes, as he must, 
that the state fiscal management of Hoboken ended in 2010.  Accordingly, there still 
exists an approximately two-year gap between Falco’s first, most prominent political 
opposition to Zimmer and Appellees’ denying him a written contract.  Because of this 
temporal chasm, Falco cannot demonstrate either “an unusually suggestive temporal 
proximity” or “a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing.”  DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 
267.   
Falco’s last resort is hence for the trier of fact to infer causation from “evidence 
gleaned from the record as a whole.”  Id. (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 
F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)).  But that, we determine, a reasonable trier of fact could not 
do in light of a record that evinces little to no other evidence of a causal link.  We thus 
conclude that Falco’s support for political candidates opposed to Zimmer was not a 
substantial or motivating factor of Appellees’ denial of Falco’s request for a written 
contract.      
4. Withholding of Benefits 
Fourth, Falco points to Appellees’ denial or delay in disbursing various benefits in 
2012, 2013, and 2014 as retaliatory acts for which his First Amendment protected 
activities were a substantial or motivating factor.  As previously discussed, the benefits at 
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issue include Appellees’ (1) belatedly disbursing to Falco (a) a 1.95% pay increase that 
other HPD officers received in 2013; and (b) an unspecified portion “substantially less” 
than the $400,000 allegedly owed to him as accrued compensation upon his retirement in 
2014, App. 209–10; and (2) outright denying to Falco (a) an annual $1,300 uniform 
stipend in 2012, 2013, and 2014; (b) an annual $1,500 attendance incentive in 2012, 
2013, and 2014; (c) a stipend for an unspecified amount for working shifts during 
Superstorm Sandy due in 2013; (d) a $500 court time and preparation benefit in 2014; 
and (e) an unspecified, “substantial[]” portion of the $400,000 allegedly owed to him as 
accrued compensation upon his retirement in 2014, id.   
Again, Falco does not specify which protected activities relate to which retaliatory 
acts.  So we must discern on our own whether any of the protected activities could have 
been the impetus for this alleged retaliation.  Here, we find all three component parts met.  
First, we can reasonably infer that Appellees were aware of Falco’s conduct, as his 
support for political rivals of Zimmer, his filing this lawsuit, and his testimony in Alicea 
were all public activities.   
Second, while some of the withheld benefits, such as the $500 court time and 
preparation benefit, may be de minimis individually, they collectively rise above the 
requisite threshold.  Brennan, in particular, instructs us to consider the “cumulative 
impact” of Appellees’ conduct on Falco’s speech.  350 F.3d at 422 n.17.  Here, we can 
say with ease that the cumulative monetary value at issue—an amount that, based on the 
allegations in Falco’s fourth amended complaint, ranges between a few thousand and a 
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few hundred thousand dollars—is substantial and would deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.   
At oral argument, counsel for Hoboken and Tooke insinuated that a deprivation of 
several thousand dollars would not chill the speech of an ordinary person.  But that 
surprising argument does not dissuade us from reaching this conclusion.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has also indicated, albeit in a different legal context, that values of a few 
thousand dollars are not de minimis.  See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987) 
(determining, in the context of a Fifth Amendment takings dispute, that amounts of 
$1,816 and $2,700 are “not trivial sums”).  As a result, the benefits that Appellees denied 
or delayed disbursing to Falco cumulatively rise above the threshold for actionability.        
Third, the close temporal proximity between Falco’s protected speech and 
Appellees’ withholding the various benefits satisfies the causal component.  For example, 
Falco alleges that, mere months after he filed the instant lawsuit in March 2013, 
Appellees denied him his Superstorm Sandy stipend in September 2013.  Additionally, 
Falco claims that Appellees denied his benefit for court time and preparation in January 
2014, less than a month after he testified in Alicea in December 2013.  More generally, 
all of the deprivations and delays in disbursing Falco’s benefits in 2012, 2013, and 2014 
occurred in sufficient proximity to his supporting political opponents of Zimmer in 2011 
and 2013.  Appellees’ depriving Falco of various benefits thus satisfies the third 
component of this element.    
* * * 
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As a final matter, we pause to address Falco’s invocation of Heffernan v. City of 
Paterson, N.J., 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016), which he laments that the District Court did not 
once reference in its disposition of this case.  Factually similar to the instant case, 
Heffernan concerned a New Jersey police officer who was demoted after he was seen 
carrying a yard sign for a political opponent of the city’s incumbent mayor.  Id. at 1416.  
The police officer’s supervisors, however, demoted him based on a factual mistake: they 
believed he was involved in the political opponent’s campaign but he was actually just 
picking up a yard sign for his bedridden mother.  Id.  As Falco characterizes the case, 
Heffernan held that “a retaliatory attempt to punish an employee’s free speech violates 
the Constitution even if it does not actually ‘coerce[ the employee] into changing’ his 
‘political allegiance’ or abridging his speech.”  Appellant’s Br. 32 (citing Heffernan, 136 
S. Ct. at 1419).  In selectively quoting the language as such, Falco attempts to undermine 
the ordinary firmness standard used in determining whether a public employee’s 
protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s retaliation.     
But Falco is incorrect for two chief reasons.  First, the sentence Falco cites reads 
in full: “Hence, we do not require plaintiffs in political affiliation cases to ‘prove that 
they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, 
their political allegiance.’”  Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  The instant case, however, is not a free association case, but a free speech one, 
rendering the cited language inapplicable.   
Second, relying on this passing reference to how the potential harm of a 
constitutional violation may extend to other employees who may be discouraged from 
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engaging in protected activities, Falco asserts that we must focus on this externalized 
harm, even if it upends decades of precedent outlining other considerations in the 
analysis.  But Heffernan’s central holding—that, “[w]hen an employer demotes an 
employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity that 
the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action 
under the First Amendment and []§ 1983 . . . even if . . . the employer makes a factual 
mistake about the employee’s behavior,” id. at 1418—has no bearing on this case.  For 
these reasons, Heffernan is merely a factually similar case that turns on an entirely 
separate legal question.  It is therefore inapposite here and the District Court rightly 
disregarded it.   
* * * 
Nonetheless, although most of Falco’s allegations regarding Appellees’ potentially 
retaliatory acts do not satisfy the second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, 
one does.  In particular, Falco has carried his burden of alleging with sufficient 
particularity that his protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in Appellees’ 
denying or belatedly disbursing various benefits to him.  Because this is all that Falco 
must show at this motion to dismiss stage, his First Amendment speech retaliation claim 
survives, albeit severely narrowed: only his support for political opponents of Zimmer, 
filing the instant lawsuit, and testifying in Alicea are protected speech activities and only 
Appellees’ withholding of various benefits is plausible retaliation.  We need not consider 
the third element of a valid First Amendment retaliation claim—whether Appellees 
would have taken the same action even if Falco had not engaged in his protected 
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speech—as Falco does not bear its burden and Appellees present no arguments to that 
effect.  See Munroe, 805 F.3d at 466 (citation omitted). 
C. Falco Fails to State Any Plausible Procedural Due Process Claims 
 
Falco also seeks to revive the procedural due process claims the District Court 
dismissed with prejudice in its order dismissing his second amended complaint.  But, 
upon reviewing these claims de novo, we determine that the District Court properly 
dismissed them. 
In order to state a claim for violation of procedural due process rights, Falco must 
allege “(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures 
available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’”  Hill, 455 F.3d at 233–34 (quoting 
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Because Falco here asserts protected 
property interests in various benefits, he must show a legitimate claim of entitlement in 
them that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) 
and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)), not merely an “abstract need or 
desire” or “unilateral expectation” for them, Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.  Such claims of 
entitlement are, of course, not created by the Constitution of the United States.  Id.  
Instead, “they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.”  Id. 
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We have identified two types of rights relevant here that are afforded due process 
protections: (1) contract rights that arise by way of extreme dependence, such as welfare 
benefits, or permanence in employment because of tenure; and (2) contract rights that 
arise from a contract provision stating that a public entity can only terminate the contract 
for cause.  Unger v. Nat’l Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1399 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citations omitted).  
In his second amended complaint—the operative complaint as to the instant 
claims—Falco asserted five counts for procedural due process violations: one each for 
Appellees’ withholding, allegedly without due process of law, various benefits, such as 
(1) a uniform allowance; (2) an attendance incentive; (3) a pay raise; (4) overtime pay, 
including a Superstorm Sandy-related stipend; and (5) a court time and preparation 
benefit.  The District Court, however, determined that Falco does not have a 
constitutionally protected property interest in any of these compensation items.  We 
agree. 
First, Falco argues that he has a constitutionally protected property interest in the 
various benefits given two state laws: N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40A:14-147 and 40A:14-179.  
Yet, for substantially the same reasons that the District Court provided, we likewise 
determine that these state laws do not establish a legitimate claim of entitlement in the 
benefits Falco seeks.  In short, the laws do not stand for the broad propositions that Falco 
presses.  In particular, N.J. Stat. Ann § 40A:14-147 only protects certain HPD officers 
from removal of office, suspension, or fines without cause; it does not, however, grant 
them a right in the various benefits at issue here.   
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Similarly, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-179 is to no avail here.  That statute requires 
that, “whenever new base salary ranges are set” for the officers of a police department in 
New Jersey, “unless the [C]hief of [P]olice . . . consent[s] to a lesser adjustment, the base 
salary for the [C]hief of [P]olice . . . shall be adjusted to ensure that [his] base salar[y] 
remain[s] higher than the base salaries of other ranking supervisory officers in the 
department.”  Id.  Unfortunately, the statute “is not a model of clarity,” opening it to 
multiple possible readings.  Smith v. Twp. of Andover, 662 A.2d 582, 586 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1995).  But appellate courts in New Jersey have consistently interpreted that, 
“[a]t a minimum, the statute requires that the [C]hief be paid a higher base salary than the 
next highest ranking officer.”  In re Snellbaker, 997 A.2d 288, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2010) (citing Smith, 662 A.2d at 586–87).   
The question is whether the statute requires anything more.  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey has not answered this question, so we must “predict how it would rule if 
faced with the issue.”  White v. Sunoco, Inc., 870 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation 
omitted).  Other New Jersey appellate courts have not looked at this precise question, so 
we cannot look to them for aid.  But we find the statutory history here to be enlightening.  
The original version of this law guaranteed that, if the other officers got a raise, the Chief 
of Police would also get a raise of “at least the same percentage.”  1991 N.J. Laws 854.  
The current version does not contain this specific guarantee.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40A:14-179.  We believe this change is significant. 
We accordingly make a prediction under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), that the statute ensures only that the Chief of Police is paid more than subordinate 
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officers.  It does not ensure that the Chief of Police will get a raise whenever his 
subordinates do.  Falco’s allegation that he did not receive a pay raise for a few months 
while other officers did does not mean that their salaries surpassed his.  In the absence of 
this specific allegation, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-179 does not create for Falco a 
protected property interest in the pay raise about which he bemoans.  
Second, Falco avers that his contractual relationship with Hoboken over several 
decades as a police officer, during which he was a member of the PBA and PSOA’s 
collective bargaining agreements with the HPD, created a legitimate claim of continued 
entitlement to the benefits in question even as Chief.  But, in the operative complaint, 
Falco himself concedes that the Chief of Police “is not a member of that bargaining unit.”  
App. 83.  Those collective bargaining agreements therefore cannot provide the basis for a 
legitimate expectation in receiving the benefits now at issue.  Without a contract 
providing such a protected property interest, Falco does not have a valid procedural due 
process claim.  
Third, Falco posits that Hoboken’s practice of providing the Chief of Police with 
the same benefits other police officers receive in their collective bargaining agreements 
and his receiving those compensation items in his early years as Chief created a protected 
property interest in them.  However, in the absence of a contract requiring that, Falco’s 
allegations are more appropriately classified as a “unilateral expectation” rather than a 
legitimate claim of entitlement.  Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
Fourth, Falco points to a Hoboken ordinance allegedly providing that department 
heads are to receive benefits equivalent to those set forth in the collective bargaining 
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agreement between Hoboken and its municipal supervisors’ union.  But the second 
amended complaint—the operative complaint as to Falco’s procedural due process 
claims—is devoid of any references to such an ordinance.  This argument is thus 
unavailing because (1) we are limited to reviewing only Falco’s operative complaint at 
this motion to dismiss stage; (2) there are no allegations regarding this argument in that 
complaint; and (3) as discussed previously, we decline to expand the record on appeal.   
For these same reasons, Falco’s sixth and seventh contentions—that Falco had 
union dues deducted from his paycheck even as Chief of Police and that Liston believes 
that Falco should have received the same benefits as PSOA members—are also in vain.  
Unable to muster a protected property interest in the benefits withheld from him, Falco 
thus has no plausible procedural due process claim, as the District Court correctly 
decided.       
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part and affirm in part the District 
Court’s orders and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3   
                                              
3 Although Appellees hastily raise the issue of qualified immunity on appeal, District 
Court did not discuss the issue in dismissing Falco’s second amended complaint and 
expressly declined to reach the issue in dismissing Falco’s fourth amended complaint.  
Accordingly, we decline to consider the issue.  See Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, 
Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We ordinarily decline to consider issues not 
decided by a district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider them in the 
first instance.” (citing In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 428 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) 
and Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 778 (3d Cir. 
2001))). 
 
In addition, Falco’s § 1985(3) claim is waived because his briefing fails to address any 
conspiracy or discriminatory animus by Appellees.  See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 
                                              
685 (3d Cir. 1997) (enumerating elements of a § 1985(3) claim); see also N.J. Media 
Grp. Inc., v. United States, 836 F.3d 421, 426 n.20 (3d Cir. 2016) (deeming an argument 
waived based on its “utterly undeveloped character” (citation omitted)). 
